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Abstract
We develop a neoclassical growth model with imperfect property rights in which
predation entails both waste of resources and deadweight losses, the latter becoming
very large when the predation rate is high. According to the model, in the United
States, the welfare costs of crime represent a loss of 186% of consumption per
capita. For a country in the average of the last decile of the distribution of an
index of business costs of crime across 94 countries, this loss is 578%. Moreover, a
one standard deviation increase in the quality index of formal institutions securing
property rights increases GDP per worker by 23% for a country with an institutional
quality index equal to the average of the last decile of its distribution.
Keywords: Rent-seeking, cross-country diﬀerences in TFP and GDP per worker,
business costs of crime, institutional quality, welfare costs of crime.
JEL classification: O10, O43, 047.
1 Introduction
Property rights are an important component of the institutional structure of a society,
which shapes incentives in human interaction. The new institutional approach to economic
development (North, 1990) emphasizes the importance of institutions in determining the
incentives faced by economic agents. In particular, security of property rights aﬀects
resource allocation by shaping the incentives of individuals to carry out productive activ-
ities because it limits expropriation risks and reduces the need to divert private resources
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2016-PG032.
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to protect property. Moreover, as pointed out by Besley and Ghatak (2010), security of
property rights also aﬀects the eﬃciency of resource allocation facilitating trade in assets
and improving collateralizability of assets.
Economic agents face the choice of allocating resources between production (i.e. to
produce something useful for others) and predation (i.e. to appropriate the property of
others). Predation aﬀects productivity negatively because it entails a waste of resources
as well as deadweight losses.1 Some authors highlighted the importance of the allocation
of talent between productive and unproductive activities for the economic performance of
a society (see, e.g., Baumol, 1990, Murphy et al., 1991, and Acemoglu and Verdier, 1998).
These authors argued that entrepreneurial talent can be reallocated towards rent-seeking
and organized crime when the returns to such activities are high relative to producing.
Some empirical evidence suggests that both predation and quality of formal institu-
tions securing property rights diﬀer greatly across countries. Figure 1 shows a significant
negative relationship between an index of business costs of crime provided by the Fraser
Institute (higher value of the index means lower business costs of crime) and a quality
index of formal institutions securing property rights for a sample of 94 countries, which
has been built using data provided by the Fraser Institute.2 Figures 2 and 3 show that
both the business costs of crime and quality of formal institutions securing property rights
are respectively related –negative and positively– with gross domestic product (GDP)
per worker. Finally, Figures 4 and 5 show that quality of formal institutions securing
property rights and total factor productivity (TFP) are significant and positively related,
while quality of formal institutions securing property rights and the ratio of capital to
GDP are not. Therefore, empirical evidence suggests that if security of property rights
influences GDP per worker, then its influence is mostly through TFP.3
The objective of this study is to provide a tractable neoclassical growth model with im-
perfect property rights and predation, which can be used in quantitative analysis and, in
particular, to evaluate the social costs of predation in terms of productivity and consump-
tion and the quantitative impact of diﬀerences in quality of formal institutions securing
property rights on diﬀerences in TFP and GDP per worker across countries. There are
1A deadweight loss is a cost to society created by market ineﬃciency, which leads to a society with
fewer available resources, while the waste of resources refers to the unproductive use of available resources.
2More details about these indexes are given in Section 3.
3Acemoglu et al. (2001), using instrumental variables in a cross-country study, argued that the positive
relationship between security of property rights and GDP per worker is indeed causal.
2
theoretical and empirical reasons that support the view that cross-country diﬀerences in
the security of property rights leading to varying predation may account for some of the
observed diﬀerences in productivity across countries.
With that objective, a neoclassical growth model with imperfect security of property
rights and predation is developed. The standard neoclassical growth model is implicitly
based on the assumption that decisions on saving and capital accumulation occur in
an institution-free world with perfect property rights. However, I move away from the
standard neoclassical framework by developing a model in which there exists an aggregate
predation function that determines the success of predatory activities. Therefore, in
the model, security of property rights is a technological (or institutional) feature of the
economic environment. Predation is modeled as the ability of individuals to unduly lay
claims to ownership of goods and services. In this regard, my model has many similarities
with the static models developed by Usher (1987) and Grossman and Kim (1995). In
these models, individuals choose whether to engage in productive or predatory activities.
However, in my model, all households derive income from capital and labor in addition
to income from predatory activities destined to appropriate output from firms. In this
framework, the hypothesis of a representative agent can be maintained and transitional
dynamics of the model are similar to those of the standard neoclassical growth model
with perfect property rights.4
In the model, imperfect security of property rights facilitates predation, which aﬀects
productivity by discouraging the accumulation of capital as well as by reducing TFP.
On one hand, predation discourages capital accumulation because it works as a tax on
production. Consequently, the ratio of capital to output is lower. On the other hand,
predation reduces TFP by wasting resources on unproductive predatory activities as well
as by dissuading business entry. Predation reduces profits of firms –which discourages
entry– because firms allocate more resources to trying to deter predation, while a large
fraction of their output is captured by predation. Fewer firms imply a lower TFP because
the production function of the firms displays decreasing returns to scale.
To my knowledge, the first and only attempt to incorporate predation in the standard
4The only important diﬀerence with the neoclassical growth model without predation is that the equi-
librium might be dynamically ineﬃcient. The issue of dynamic ineﬃciency has been profusely analyzed
in economic literature (see, for example, Phelps, 1961, Diamond, 1965, and Abel et al., 1989).
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neoclassical growth model was made by Barelli and De Abreu Pessôa (2012).5 Their
model looks similar to the model developed in this study. However, some important
diﬀerences must be pointed out. First, they built a two-sector model, whereas I prefer to
develop a one-sector model, because I consider it simpler to use in empirical applications.
Second, in my model, firms can devote resources to mitigate predation, whilst in Barelli
and De Abreu Pessôa (2012)’s model this use is not considered. The waste of resources
on activities oriented towards deterring predation (which empirically can be at least as
important as the amount of resources devoted to capture rents) amplifies the negative
eﬀects of predation on productivity. Third, the deadweight losses caused by predation are
not due exclusively to the reduction of capital accumulation, but also to the reduction in
the number of firms. In the model, the deadweight losses caused by the decrease in the
number of firms may be greater than the social costs of predation due to the waste of
resources. In this regard, the implications of my model are diﬀerent from those of Barelli
and De Abreu Pessôa (2012)’s model, in which the deadweight losses always have a second-
order importance.6 According to the calibrated model, the eﬀect of the deadweight losses
on the reduction of long-run consumption per worker becomes higher than the eﬀect of
the waste of resources when the costs of predatory activities are high.
The simulation of the model shows that the welfare and productivity losses caused
by crime –which is an important type of predation– can be noteworthy. The model is
calibrated using data on the costs of crime in the United States provided by Anderson
(1999). According to the calibrated model, in the United States the ratio of business
costs of crime to GDP is 20% and the welfare costs of crime represent a loss of 186%
of consumption per capita, while GDP per worker is reduced by 175%. Once the model
has been calibrated for the United States, the ratio of business costs of crime to GDP is
calculated for each country in a sample of 94 countries using the index of business costs
of crime provided by the Fraser Institute. Assuming that cross-country diﬀerences in the
business costs of crime are due to diﬀerences in neutral eﬃciency in predation, the costs of
crime in terms of consumption per worker and GDP per worker can be deduced for each
5Some authors (see, e.g., Tornell and Velasco, 1992, Benhabib and Rustichini, 1996, and Grossman
and Kim, 1996) developed models with rent-seeking and capital accumulation, but they used a type of
 technology. Predation is a way of rent-seeking, but the latter may take other forms beyond predation.
6There is a debate in rent-seeking literature on the relative importance of both eﬀects (deadweight
losses and waste of resources). Posner (1975) evaluated empirically both eﬀects for a monopoly in a
partial equilibrium framework. Tullock (1967) conducted pioneering wrok on the analysis of rent-seeking.
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country. In particular, according to the calibrated model, the ratio of the business costs
of crime to GDP of a country in the average of the sample is 282% and consumption per
worker and GDP per worker are reduced by 251% and 238%, respectively. Moreover,
the ratio of the business costs of crime to GDP of a country with a value of the index
equal to the average value of the last (resp. first ) decile is 645% (resp. 146%) and its
consumption per worker and GDP per worker are reduced by 578% (resp. 147%) and
559% (resp. 139%), respectively.
In addition, using data provided by the Fraser Institute on the legal structure and
security of property rights for 94 countries, a quality index of formal institutions securing
property rights for each country in the sample is built. Assuming that neutral eﬃciency
in predation is inversely related to this index of quality, TFP and GDP per worker for
each country are computed and then compared with their empirical counterparts. In the
calibrated model, countries in the first decile of the distribution of the quality index of
formal institutions securing property rights have, on average, 125 times higher TFP and
146 times higher GDP per worker than countries in the last decile. In the data, the
corresponding values are 286 and 836.
The percentage impact of improvements in the quality of formal institutions securing
property rights on productivity is higher in countries at the bottom of the distribution and
lower in countries at the top, because, according to the model, the relationships between
the logarithms of TFP and GDP per worker and the logarithm of the quality index of
formal institutions securing property rights are non-linear and concave. According to the
calibrated model, if the quality index of formal institutions increases by one standard
deviation, then, for a country with a value of the index equal to the average value of the
last decile (resp. first decile) of its distribution, the ratio of business costs of predation
to GDP decreases by 36% (resp. 16%), while its GDP per worker increases by 23% (resp.
27%), and its TFP increases by 12% (resp. 15%).7
On one hand, this paper is related to the significant empirical literature using cross-
country data to evaluate the impact of institutional quality and, in particular, security of
7I report the impact of a one standard deviation increase because, according to the distribution of the
index, it can be considered a normal (or likely) increase that might be achieved by means of reasonable
institutional reforms. Pande and Udry (2006) provide an excellent and comprehensive review of the
macroeconomic literature on institutions and growth that has largely relied on cross-country regression
evidence. In order to summarize the findings of the literature, they also reported on the impact of one
standard deviation increase in the indexes of institutional quality on productivity and growth.
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property rights on economic outcomes (see, e.g., Knack and Keefer, 1995, Mauro, 1995,
Hall and Jones, 1999, and Acemoglu et al., 2001). These authors followed an econometric
approach and found a significant positive impact of security of property rights on produc-
tivity. However, I develop a general equilibrium growth model to evaluate the impact of
security of property rights and predation on productivity and welfare. Therefore, on the
other hand, this paper also relates to a strand of macroeconomic literature developing gen-
eral equilibrium macroeconomic models that analyze how and to what extent institutions
and economic policies causing resource misallocation can account for the observed dif-
ferences in productivity across countries (see, e.g., Restuccia and Rogerson, 2008, Hsieh
and Klenow, 2009, Poschke, 2010, Barseghyan and DiCecio, 2011, Moscoso-Boedo and
Mukoyama, 2012, and del Rio and Sampayo, 2017).
This paper is organized as follows. The model is described in Section 2. Section 3
analyzes the quantitative impact of diﬀerences in security of property rights and predation
on productivity and welfare. Section 4 concludes.
2 The model
The economy is inhabited by a continuum of identical households with measure 1. The
number of members of a household at time  is  = 0e –with 0  0 and  being the
population growth rate. Every individual is endowed with a unit of labor. A continuum
of perfectly competitive identical firms produce a final good using labor and capital. The
number of firms is endogenously determined by a free entry condition. A final good is
produced that can be devoted to consumption, , and investment, , in addition to
carrying out and deterring predation. Households derive income from renting capital and
labor to firms and from predatory activities destined to capture output from firms, while
firms devote resources to deter predation. The evolution law of aggregate capital, , is
· =  −  (1)
where 0    1 is the depreciation rate. Capital markets are perfect and there are not
adjustment costs. Therefore, the rental price of capital in a perfectly competitive market
is  + , where  is the interest rate.
The predation rate
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Aggregate output captured by households from firms by means of predation, , is a
function of output devoted by households to carry out predation, , output devoted by
firms to deter predation, , and aggregate output, . In particular, it is assumed that an
aggregate predation function exists,  =  ( ), which arises from technological
and institutional factors.8 The parameter   0 determines neutral eﬃciency in predation.
A high value of  represents low security of property rights. If  = 0, then security of
property rights is perfect, which is implicitly assumed by the standard neoclassical growth
model. The aggregate predation function, , is assumed to be homogeneous of degree 1.9
Therefore, the predation rate,  =  , is a function of the fraction of aggregate output
devoted by households to carry out predation,  =  , and the fraction of aggregate
output devoted by firms to deter predation,  =  ,
 =  ( )  (2)
where  ( ) ≡ 
³

    1
´
. It is assumed that  is increasing and concave in 
(1  0, 11  0) and decreasing and convex in  (2  0 and 22  0).10 A part of
output captured by households from firms is appropriated by households, , whilst
another part is destroyed in the course of predation, (1− ) , where 0    1.
Therefore, net aggregate output is [1− (1− ) ].
Firms
Each firm uses a Cobb—Douglas production function,
 = e(1−)1− ¡1− ¢  (3)
where   0, 0    1, 0    1,  ≥ 0,  is output of firm , while  and 
respectively are the stock of capital and variable number of workers used by a firm in
production.11 The parameter  reflects the extent of decreasing internal returns to scale
8Microfoundation of the predation function is an important issue that is not addressed here. However,
some microstructure of the predatory sector is provided in Appendix C.
9A replicability argument, similar to that used in the case of a neoclassical production function, could
be used to justify the assumption of homogeneity of degree 1, which is also needed to guarantee the
existence of a balanced growth path.
10The neoclassical production function requires analogous properties on the marginal productivities
of factors. In particular, the assumed properties on the predation function imply that the predation
rate increases (resp. decreases) when the fraction of resources devoted to carry out predation (resp. the
fraction of resources devoted to deter predation) increases, but the change rate is decreasing.
11Hopenhayn (1992) and Barseghyan and DiCecio (2011) use a similar production function in order
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from both capital and labor and  is the rate of technical progress.
A firm engaged in production incurs an operating cost consisting of wages paid to 
units of overhead labor. Total variable labor is  = R 0  d , while total overhead
labor is equal to , where  is the number of firms. In equilibrium, labor supply must
be equal to total variable labor plus total overhead labor,  =  + . The previous
equation can be rewritten in terms per capita as
1 =  +  (4)
where  =  is total variable labor per capita and  =  is the number of firms per
capita.
Firm  hires capital and labor and devotes an amount  of its output to deter
predation. The wage rate is  and the rental price of capital is + . A fraction, , of
its output is captured by predation. It is assumed that  = 
³


´
, where  0  0,
 00  0,  (1) = 1 and − 0 (1) =   0. Parameter  determines specific eﬃciency in
deterrence of predation.
Each firm maximizes its profits
Π =
∙
1− 
µ

¶¸
 − ( + ) − ( + )−
subject to the technological constraint (3). Considering that all firms are identical (which
implies that  =    =    =  ,  =  and  = ), first-order conditions
for the profit-maximizing problem of a firm are
 (1− ) (1− )  =  (5)
 (1− )  =  +  (6)
and
  = 1 (7)
to analyze the impact of entry costs on productivity. These authors also suppose fixed costs and an
endogenous number of firms. Barseghyan and DiCecio (2011) calibrated the magnitude of the fixed costs
and decreasing returns to scale to reproduce some moments of the employment distribution across plants
in the United States
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where  =  e− is detrended aggregate output per capita,  =  e− is detrended
aggregate capital per capita, and  =e− is the detrended wage rate. Equations (5)
and (6) state that the after-predation marginal productivities of labor and capital equal
their user costs. Predation discourages capital accumulation and employment because it
works as a tax on production. Equation (7) states that the marginal revenue of resources
allocated to prevent predation equals their marginal cost, which is equal to 1.
The number of firms, , is determined by a free entry condition establishing that the
expected value of a firm equals zero. All firms are identical and have the same profits,
Π = Π. The free entry condition implies that profits of firms must be zero for all ,
Π = 0. Profits are zero if and only if
(1− )
∙
1− −  (1− ) 1− 
¸
=  (8)
which follows from the first order conditions for a firm (5)-(7) and the equilibrium condi-
tion in the labor market (4). Equations (4) and (8) imply that the number of firms is a
decreasing function of the predation rate.
Households
The utility function of household  is
Z ∞
0
e−
1−
1− d  (9)
where    is the time discount rate,  is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution,
and  is consumption per capita. A household devotes resources to consumption, capital
accumulation, , and predation, , while it rents out capital and labor to firms
and obtains a fraction 
³


´
of the aggregate transfers generated by predation,  =

³


´
, where 0  0, 00  0,  (1) = 1, and 0 (1) =   0. Parameter  determines
specific eﬃciency in predation-holding activities.12
12In the model, predation and its deterrence are modeled as a contest among individuals and among
firms, respectively. The assumed predatory technology for households and the assumed predation-
deterring technology for firms can be seen as contest success functions. Tullock (1975, 1980) introduced
the contest success function in the theory of rent-seeking. See Van Long (2012) for a survey on the theory
of contests. As Skaperdas (1996) wrote, "Tournaments, conflict, and rent-seeking have been modelled
as contests in which participants exert eﬀort to increase their probability of winning a price. A contest
success function provides each player’s probability of winning as a function of all player’s eﬀorts.".
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A household maximizes its intertemporal utility (9) subject to its budget constraint
 + +  = + ( + ) + 
µ

¶

and the evolution law of capital  =  − . Considering that households are
identical (which implies that  =  ,  = ,  =  and  = ), a maximum of
the optimization problem of a household is characterized by the transversality condition,
lim
→∞
e−
 
0 (−−)d  = 0 (10)
together with the Euler equation,
•
 =
1
 ( − )− , (11)
where  =  e− is detrended consumption per capita, and
  = 1 (12)
Equation (12) states that the marginal revenue of predation equals its marginal cost,
which is 1. It is assumed that  +    +  is satisfied in order to ensure that the
transversality condition holds.
Closing the model
Considering that all firms are identical, it follows from the production function (3)
and equilibrium condition in the labor market (4) that the detrended aggregate output
per capita is given by
 =   (13)
where  is multifactor productivity in the final good sector,
 =
µ

¶1−
(1−) (1− )1−  (14)
which depends on the allocation of labor between labor directly used in production and
overhead use. In particular, the multifactor productivity in the final good sector decreases
when the number of firms decreases (which implies that the labor directly used in pro-
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duction increases), because firms display decreasing returns to scale (see Proposition 4 in
Appendix A).
Net aggregate output, (1− (1− ) ), can be allocated to consumption, , in-
vestment, , carrying out of predatory activities, , and deterrence of predation, .
Therefore, the aggregate resource constraint is  +  +  +  = (1− (1− ) ),
which, considering (7) and (12), can be rewritten in terms of the detrended variables per
capita as
 +  = (1− (1−  + + ) )  (15)
where  =  e− is the detrended investment per capita. The evolution law of capital,
(1), can also be rewritten in terms of detrended variables per capita as,
• =  − ( +  + )  (16)
On the existence of an interior equilibrium
From (2), (7) and (12) it follows that, in equilibrium, the predation rate is given by
 ( ) = , (17)
and the fraction of output devoted to carry out predation and the fraction of output
devoted to deter predation are both proportional to the predation rate,
 =  (18)
and
 =  (19)
From (17),(18) and (19), it follows that, in equilibrium, ,  and  are constant for all .
Therefore, from (4), (8) and (14), it also follows that, in equilibrium, the number of firms
per capita, , total variable labor per capita, , and multifactor productivity, , are also
constant.
The assumptions made on function ( ) do not restrict the number of equilibria that
may exist, if any. In order to ensure that a unique interior equilibrium exists, it is assumed
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that (i) e () ≡  ( ) is strictly increasing and concave, (ii) lim−→0 e () ≥ 0, (iii)
lim−→∞ e0 () = 0, and (iv) lim−→0 e0 ()  1 whenever lim−→0 e () = 0. In an interior
equilibrium,    and  must lie between 0 and 1 and  +  must be strictly positive,
which is satisfied if (1−  + + )  is also between 0 and 1. Under assumptions (i)-(iv),
the predation rate, , is a strictly increasing function of neutral eﬃciency in predation,
 (see Proposition 2 in Appendix A). Therefore, there exists a suﬃciently small  such
that an interior equilibrium exists (see Proposition 1 in Appendix A). However, if neutral
eﬃciency in predation, , is much too large, then the model displays a corner solution in
which the economy collapses.13 The resource allocation between predation and productive
activities is analyzed in Appendix A.
As analyzed in Appendix B, the phase diagram of the model with imperfect security of
property rights and predation is similar to the phase diagram of the standard neoclassical
growth model. Therefore, dynamics of the model with imperfect property rights and
predation are similar to the dynamics of the standard neoclassical growth model. The
only diﬀerence is that an equilibrium of the model with imperfect property rights and
predation might be dynamically ineﬃcient even if the transversality condition is satisfied
(see Appendix B).
Diﬀerences in productivity: TFP vs. the ratio of capital to GDP
It is assumed that a fraction 0  1 −   1 of the resources devoted to carrying out
predation and a fraction 0  1−   1 of the resources devoted to deterrring predation
are included in GDP. Therefore, it follows from substituting (13) into (15) that GDP per
worker, , is given by
 ≡  +  + [(1− ) + (1− )]  =  (20)
where  = (1− (1−  +  + ) )  is TFP, which depends on both the measured
waste of resources in predation and multifactor productivity in the final sector.14 Equation
(20) can be rewritten as  =  11−
³


´ 
1−
. Therefore, cross-country diﬀerences in
GDP per worker can be broken down into two factors: contribution of TFP,  11− , and
13The decentralized equilibrium is ineﬃcient because the predatory contest for resources entails a
cooperation failure. In particular, if the economic agents could commit toward cooperative strategies, or
if a benevolent planner could decide resource allocation, then predation would not happen.
14In the model, variables per capita and per worker are equal.
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contribution of the ratio of capital to GDP,
³


´ 
1−
.15
A higher neutral eﬃciency in predation and, consequently, a higher predation rate
reduce TFP in two ways. On one hand, the amount of resources wasted in predatory
activities is higher. On the other hand, profits of firms decrease because a higher fraction
of their output is captured by predation and also because they devote a higher fraction
of their output to deter predation. Lower profits result in a lower number of firms, which
reduces multifactor productivity in the final good (see Proposition 7 in Appendix A).
The ratio of capital to GDP equals the ratio of capital to output multiplied by the
ratio of output to GDP,  =



 , where the ratio of capital to output is

 =

+ (1− ), which follows from the first order condition (6), and the ratio of output to
GDP is  = [1− (1−  +  + ) ]−1, which follows from equations (13) and (20).
Along a balanced growth path, the interest rate is constant,  =  + , and, thus, the
ratio of capital to output is also constant.
The eﬀect of a higher neutral eﬃciency leading to higher predation rate on the ratio of
capital to GDP is ambiguous. A higher predation rate, on one hand, discourages capital
accumulation and, consequently, the ratio of capital to output decreases, however, on
the other hand, the ratio of output to GDP increases because more resources are wasted
on unproductive predatory activities. Therefore, if 1 −  +  +  is near 1, then
changes in neutral eﬃciency in predation and, consequently, in the predation rate have
a weak impact on GDP per worker through changes in the ratio of capital to GDP (see
Proposition 7 in Appendix A). This is important from an empirical point of view, as will
become clear below.
Business costs of predation
The costs of predation for firm  are  + . The aggregate business costs of
predation are equal to the sum of the costs of predation for all firms. In a symmetric equi-
librium, the detrended aggregate business costs of predation per worker are (1 + ) .
Therefore, the ratio of aggregate business costs of predation to GDP is
 = (1 + )   =
(1 + ) 
1− (1−  +  + )  (21)
15Hall and Jones (1999) use a similar breakdown to calculate the contributions of diﬀerences in TFP,
the ratio of capital to GDP and human capital to diﬀerences in GDP per worker across countries.
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which is an increasing function of the predation rate.
Deadweight losses vs. waste of resources
Given that all households are identical, the intertemporal utility is the social welfare
function. Therefore, in the long run, social welfare decreases when long-run consumption
per capita falls. Moreover, reduction of social welfare in the long run will be proportional
to the drop in long-run consumption per capita.
A higher neutral eﬃciency in predation leads to higher predation rate which reduces
the long-run consumption per capita (see Proposition 6 in Appendix A) and, hence, the
long-run social welfare. If an equilibrium is dynamically eﬃcient, then it follows from the
phase diagram of the model that a higher neutral eﬃciency in predation leading to higher
predation rate reduces consumption per capita both in the short and long runs. Thus,
social welfare decreases.16 In the next section, I compute the fall of long-run consumption
per capita due to an increase in the predation rate caused by an increase in neutral
eﬃciency in predation.
Reduction in consumption is due to both the deadweight losses and waste of resources
in predatory activities. In particular, a higher neutral eﬃciency in predation leads to
higher predation rate which reduces the long-run consumption per capita because the
number of firms per capita, , and capital stock per capita, , decrease, as well as because
the term (1− (1−  +  + ) ) is lower.17 The fall in long-run consumption per capita
caused by the decrease in the number of firms per capita and stock of detrended capital
per capita is a deadweight loss, while the fall of (1− (1−  +  + ) ) represents a loss
due to the waste of resources.
The deadweight losses might be higher than the losses due to the waste of resources.
From equations (4) and (8), it follows that the number of firms is a strictly decreasing
function of the predation rate and it goes to 0 when the predation rate goes to the upper
bound  = 1−
1−+ . Consequently, multifactor productivity in the final sector, , goes to 0
when  goes to  and, thus, the detrended output per capita, , detrended consumption per
capita, , and detrended capital per capita, , also go to 0, while (1− (1−  +  + ) )
goes to
³
1− (1−  +  + ) 1−
1−+
´
, which is higher than 0 if (1− )  (1− )+ 
16However, if an equilibrium is dynamically ineﬃcient, it follows from the phase diagram that con-
sumption per capita might increase in the short run when an increase in neutral eﬃciency in predation
leads to a higher predation rate. Therefore, in a dynamically ineﬃcient equilibrium, the eﬀect of higher
predation on social welfare is a priori ambiguous.
17A lower number of firms per capita, , implies lower multifactor productivity in the final sector, .14
1. This condition is satisfied for the calibrated values of the parameters further below.
Therefore, if (1− )  (1− )+  1, then the eﬀect of the deadweight losses on social
welfare becomes more important than the eﬀect of the waste of resources when neutral
eﬃciency in predation and, consequently, the predation rate are suﬃciently high.
Considering that along a balanced growth path
• = 0 and • = 0, it follows from (15)
and (16) that the detrended consumption per worker is given by
 =
∙
1− (1−  + + ) − ( +  + ) 
¸

Diﬀerentiating the previous equation with respect to  gives
d 
d  = − (1−  + + )
 
 | {z }
Eﬀect of the waste of resources
+


 
 
 
  + ( +  + )
 
 
 
 | {z }
Eﬀect of the deadweight losses
 (22)
which breaks down the fall in long-run consumption per worker caused by an increase in
neutral eﬃciency in predation and, consequently, in the predation rate into two eﬀects.
The first eﬀect is that of the waste of resources, which measures the fall in long-run
consumption per worker due to the increase in the waste of resources, the second is the
eﬀect of the deadweight losses, which measures the fall in long-run consumption per worker
due to the distorting eﬀects of predation: an increase in neutral eﬃciency in predation
leads to higher predation rate, which, on one hand, reduces long-run consumption per
worker because both multifactor productivity and ratio of capital to output decrease and,
on the other hand, increases long-run consumption per worker because the investment
rate decreases.
3 Cross-country diﬀerences in productivity and wel-
fare
In this section, the quantitative impact of diﬀerences in neutral eﬃciency in predation and,
consequently, in the predation rate on long-run productivity and long-run consumption
per worker are analyzed. Moreover, it will be assumed that neutral eﬃciency in predation
depends on the quality of formal institutions securing property rights and the impact of
improving their quality on productivity will be evaluated.
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Calibration
The model is calibrated using the data reported by Anderson (1999) on the aggregate
burden of crime in the United States, which are displayed in Table 1. The data are in
billions of 1997 dollars. I have classified them into four categories (see last column of
Table 1): Resources devoted to carrying out predation (), resources devoted to deterring
predation (), resources destroyed in the course of predation (), and resources trans-
ferred by predation ( ). If a cost is classified into two diﬀerent categories, then half of the
amount is allocated to each category, except for drug traﬃcking expenditures which are
allocated entirely to the two categories in which are classified.18 I explain the reason for
this choice below. I have also classify the resources devoted to carrying out predation ()
and deterring predation () into two categories: resources included and not included in
the measured GDP; the latter is denoted with an asterisk (*) in the third column of Table
1. The aggregate resources captured by predation are the sum of aggregate resources
destroyed in the course of predation and aggregate resources transferred by predation,
 =  +  . The total amounts of all categories are displayed in Table 2 together with
U.S. GDP for year 1997 in billions of 1997 dollars.19
The figures used to calibrate the parameters related to the predatory activities are
obtained from the data displayed in Table 2. According to these data, resources devoted to
deterring predation, , were about 20% of the aggregate resources captured by predation,
. From equation (7), it follows that  = . Therefore, I set  = 020. Resources
destroyed in the course of predatory activities, , represent about 45% of the resources
captured by predation activities, . Therefore, I set  = 055. Resources devoted to
carrying out predation, , were about 145% of the aggregate resources captured by
predation, . From equation (12), it follows that  = . Therefore, I set  = 026.
About 32% of the resources devoted to deterring predation and 99% of the resources
devoted to carrying out predation are not accounted for in GDP. Therefore, I set  = 032
and  = 099. The aggregate resources captured by predation, , represent about 167% of
U.S. GDP. Therefore, I set   = 0167. Moreover, considering that  = 11−(1−++) ,
18I explain below why drug traﬃcking expenditures are entirely allocated to the two categories. Re-
garding other Anderson’s categories of expenditure, allocating one half to each category is an arbitrary
choice, but the magnitude of the involved figures is small, and the calibration depends very little on this
choice.
19U.S. GDP for 1997 in billions of 1997 dollars is obtained by multiplying U.S. GDP for the year 1997
in billions of 2005 dollars by U.S. Parity Power Purchase in 1997. Both variables are taken from the Penn
World Table 8.0 (PWT 8.0).
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the calibrated value of the predation rate is  = 015. Considering that the ratio of
business costs of predation to GDP is  = (1+)1−(1−++) , the calibrated value of 
is 020. Assuming that the aggregate predation function is  ( ) =  and considering
that  =  ( ) and  =  , the calibrated value of  is 021.
Values for , , , , ,  and  must also be calibrated to simulate the model.20
The parameter  determines the degree of the diminishing returns to scale in variable
inputs at the firm level. It is set at 085. This value is commonly used in the literature
(see, e.g., Atkeson and Kehoe, 2005; Restuccia and Rogerson, 2008; and Barseghyan
and DiCecio, 2011), and it is very close to the estimated value of 084 in Basu (1996).21
I set  = 1
3
, which is the value used by Hall and Jones (1999), among many other
authors. Given the assumed value for ,  is equal to 0392. The elasticity of output with
respect to capital is  in the model. Using U.S. time series data, Kydland and Prescott
(1982) calculated the elasticity of output with respect to capital being approximately
036, which is near the calibrated value, 1
3
. I prefer to use the latter because it is widely
used in many works accounting for the observed diﬀerences in GDP per worker and TFP
across countries. Nonetheless, using either has no significant impact on the results of
the simulations below. For the rest of the parameters I set values that are standard in
the literature. The average annual growth rate of U.S. GDP per worker is about 18%.
Therefore, I set  = 0018. The U.S. average annual depreciation rate reported by the
PWT 8.0 is about 4%. Therefore, I set  = 004. I assume that the instantaneous utility
function takes a logarithmic form. Therefore, I set  = 1. I also set  = 0042, and thus
the long-run interest rate is 6%. The U.S. average annual population growth rate is about
1%. Therefore, I set  = 001.
Some remarks about the calibration
According to Anderson (1999)’s data, the magnitude of the resources involved in drug
traﬃcking is very large. If drug traﬃcking is considered an economic activity producing
an injurious good, then it must be considered a predatory activity, and its ill consequences
(e.g., of drug consumption) are costs associated with predation. However, if drug traﬃck-
20To compute relative values of GDP per worker, TFP, ratio of capital to GDP and ratio of business
costs of predation to GDP for diﬀerent values of , only the parameters  and  must be calibrated.
However, to compute relative consumption per capita, the remaining parameters must also be calibrated.
21The lowest bound of the range of estimates recovered by Basu and Fernald (1997) using industry—level
data is 08. Using plant—level data, Lee (2005) found that returns to scale in manufacturing vary from
0828 to 091, depending on the estimator.
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ing is considered an economic activity producing a useful good then it is not a predatory
activity. Drug traﬃcking may sometimes, and for some individuals, involves an activity
producing a useful good and sometimes, and for some individuals, a harmful good. How-
ever, I follow Anderson (1999) and the legal convention and I consider that drugs are
purely harmful goods.
According to the Anderson’s data, drug traﬃcking annually moves $161 billion in the
United States. If drugs are injurious commodities, then this expenditure must be consid-
ered a predatory transfer from drug consumers to drug traﬃckers and the damages caused
by their consumption must be considered resources destroyed by predation. However, it
must be considered that drug traﬃcking involves important costs in production, transport
and distribution. If there is perfect competition and constant returns to scale, then these
$161 billion equal the total compensation of the productive factors, and this magnitude
can be attributed to the category "Resources devoted to carrying out predation". I do it
this way.22
Certain costs of drug traﬃcking can already be included in other Anderson’s categories
such as “Criminals’ lost work days” or “Small arms and small arms ammunition”. In
this case, the drug-related part of the magnitude of these categories would have to be
subtracted from the $161 billion, but, I do not have the necessary information to do
this. However, given the magnitudes of the involved categories, the adjustment would not
change the results of the calibration too much.
There are other Anderson’s categories grouped in his broader category “transfers costs”
that I have included in the category "Resources transferred by predation" but not in the
category “Resources devoted to carry out predation”. Following the same argument I
made for drug traﬃcking expenditures, these categories might be included. However, I
do not include them because the resources devoted to carrying out predatory activities
described by these categories have to be included in other Anderson’s categories (for
example in “Criminals’ lost work days” or “Small arms and small arms ammunition”) to
a larger extent than the resources devoted to carrying out drug traﬃcking because this
last activity entails high costs in terms of production, transport, and distribution which
mostly are not included in other Anderson’s categories. However, other activities included
22Moreover, often organizations involved in drug traﬃcking are also involved in other crime activities
and, consequently, the reported drug traﬃcking expenditures might reflect the resources devoted to
carrying out other predatory activities.
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in the broad Anderson’s category “transfers costs” do not entail high costs in terms of
production, transport and distribution.
An alternative calibration
Including drug traﬃcking as a predatory activity can be controversial. The magni-
tude of drug traﬃcking expenditures is large. Therefore, including drug traﬃcking or not
among the predatory activities can be of great relevance for the calibration and, conse-
quently, for the quantitative results of the simulations. For this reason, I again calibrate
the model while excluding the Anderson’s categories “Drug traﬃcking”, “Drug control”
and “Prenatal exposures to cocaine and heroine which are activities related to drug traf-
ficking and drug consumption. The calibration procedure is as before. The calibrated
parameters are  = 0225,  = 0067,  = 05,  = 097,  = 0335 and  = 088. The
calibrated predation rate is  = 0133 and the calibrated ratio of business costs of preda-
tion to GDP is  = 0177. The results of simulating the model under this alternative
calibration are briefly reported below. As will be seen, the results do not diﬀer too much
from those obtained under the baseline calibration.
Business costs of crime, productivity and welfare
The model is simulated for diﬀerent values of  to analyze the quantitative relationship
between the business costs of predation, productivity and welfare. First, the ratio of
business costs of predation to GDP, relative consumption per worker, and relative GDP
per worker as well as contributions of TFP and the ratio of capital to GDP are calculated
for each value of . The results of the simulation are displayed in Figure 6. The simulated
ratios of business costs of predation to GDP relative to the calibrated ratio of business
costs of predation to GDP (which corresponds to the U.S. economy and is 020) are
displayed in the horizontal axis of Figure 6. The simulated values of all other variables
are displayed in the vertical axis (the values of these variables are normalized to 1 for the
economy without predation, i.e.  = 0). Second, the relative eﬀects of the deadweight
losses and of the waste of resources on the fall of long-run consumption per worker also
are calculated for each value of . Figure 7 displays both eﬀects (both relative to the
total fall in long-run consumption per worker caused by an increase in ) in the vertical
axis and the simulated ratios of business costs of predation relative to the United States
in the horizontal axis.
The predation rate can change because neutral eﬃciency in predation, , varies, but
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also because other parameters of the model change. However, as reported by Inklaar and
Timmer (2013), the ratio of capital to GDP is not significantly correlated with GDP per
worker across countries. Figure 5 also shows that there is not a significant dependence
between the quality index of formal institutions securing property rights and the ratio of
capital to GDP. This empirical evidence is consistent with the fact that 1−  + +
is constant and near 1 and that cross-country systematic changes in  ,  or  are not
the cause of changes in predation and GDP per worker across countries. Therefore, to
generate a weak relationship of the ratio of capital to GDP with both GDP per worker
and the predation rate, as well as with the quality index of formal institutions securing
property rights, it is assumed that changes in predation across countries are exclusively
caused by changes in neutral eﬃciency in predation.
As illustrated in Figure 6, for the calibrated values of the parameters, changes in
neutral eﬃciency in predation generate small diﬀerences in the ratio of capital to GDP.
Therefore, diﬀerences between the contribution of TFP and GDP per worker are small,
which means that most of the diﬀerences in GDP per worker are due to diﬀerences in
TFP. The reason is that 1−  + +  is near 1. In particular, the calibrated values
for the United States imply that 1−  + +  = 066.
As Figure 6 shows, the relationship between the ratio of business costs of predation to
GDP and GDP per worker is non-linear. The slope of the relationship increases dramati-
cally for large values of the ratio of business costs of predation to GDP (around 33 times
the calibrated ratio). Accordingly, small cross-country diﬀerences in the ratio of business
costs of predation to GDP suppose large diﬀerences in GDP per worker when the value
of the former is high. Moreover, there is an upper bound (around 35 times the calibrated
ratio) such that, if the ratio of business costs of predation to GDP exceed it, then GDP
per worker is zero.23 The reason for the collapse is that firms do not find it profitable to
produce, because the business costs of predation are very large.
Figure 6 also illustrates the magnitude of the negative consequences of predation on
welfare and productivity. In the model, U.S. GDP per worker is 825% of the GDP per
worker in the economy without predation, and U.S. consumption per worker is 814%.24
23Equation (21) establishes a strictly increasing relationship between the ratio of business costs of
predation to GDP, , and the predation rate, . Therefore, the upper bound for the collapse could also
be established on  or .
24The U.S. economy corresponds to the calibrated economy.
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Therefore, according to the model, the U.S. welfare costs of crime represent a loss of 186%
of consumption per worker and GDP per worker is reduced by 175%.25
The Economic Freedom Network (EFN), led by the Fraser Institute of Canada, pro-
vides an index of the business costs of crime for a large sample of countries. A higher
value of the index of business costs of crime means lower business costs of crime. I use
the inverse of the index of the business costs of crime in country  relative to the United
States as a proxy of the ratio of business costs of predation to GDP in country  relative
to the United States. In particular, I calculate  = Φ−1 , where  is the ratio
of business costs of crime to GDP in country ,  is the U.S. ratio of business costs of
crime to GDP (i.e., the calibrated value of 020) and Φ denotes the value of the index
of the business costs of crime in country  relative to the United States. Once  is
calculated for each country, using equation (21) and that  =   , values for  and 
can be calculated for each country .
In the sample of 94 countries for the year 2005, the value of the index of business costs
of crime relative to the United States ranks from 070 (Iceland) to 479 (Venezuela); its
average is 140, standard deviation is 078, average of the first decile is 073, and average
of the last decile is 321. The ratio of business costs of crime to GDP of a country in the
average of the sample (i.e., with the value of the index at 140) is 282% and, according to
the calibrated model, consumption per worker and GDP per worker are reduced by 251%
and 238%, respectively. The ratio of business costs of crime to GDP of a country with a
value of the index equal to the average value of the last (resp. first ) decile is 645% (resp.
146%) and its consumption per worker and GDP per worker are reduced by 578% (resp.
1465%) and 559% (resp. 139%), respectively.26
The main conclusion that can be drawn from Figure 7 is that the eﬀect of the dead-
weight losses becomes higher than the eﬀect of the waste of resources for high values of
neutral eﬃciency in predation and, consequently, for high values of the ratio of business
costs of predation to GDP. For the United States, the eﬀect of the waste of resources is
higher than the eﬀect of deadweight losses. In particular, in the United States, 786%
25Under the alternative calibration, the U.S. welfare costs of crime represent a loss of 158% of con-
sumption per worker and GDP per worker is reduced by 148%.
26Under the alternative calibration, the ratio of business costs of crime to GDP of a country in the
sample average is 248%, while consumption per worker and GDP per worker are reduced by 216% and
204%, respectively. The ratio of business costs of crime to GDP of a country with the value of the index
equal to the average value of the last (resp. first ) decile is 568% (resp. 13%) and its consumption per
worker and GDP per worker are reduced by 518% (resp. 118%) and 499% (resp. 111%), respectively
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of the reduction in long-run consumption per worker caused by an increase in neutral
eﬃciency in predation leading to an increase in the predation rate would be due to waste
of resources, while 214% would be due to deadweight losses (see Figure 7). For a country
in the sample average of the distribution of the index of business costs of crime, these
percentages are 755% and 245%, respectively, while for a country in the average of the
last decile, these percentages are reversed as, 215% and 785%. For a country in the
average of the ninth decile (i.e., with an index of business costs of crime 211 times higher
than the U.S. index), these percentages are 333% and 667%.27 Therefore, an increase in
neutral eﬃciency in predation leading to an increase in the predation rate would cause
higher deadweight losses than waste of resources only in countries in the bottom of the
distribution. Particularly, in countries with an index of business costs of crime around
28 or more times the U.S. index.28
Property rights and productivity
I assume that neutral eﬃciency in predation in country , , is inversely related to
quality of formal institutions securing property rights in country ,  = Ω, where
  0,   0, and Ω indicates the quality of formal institutions securing property
rights in country . I assume that all countries are identical except for the quality of
formal institutions securing property rights. From equation (21), it follows that 1 =


³
1+
 + (1−  +  + )
´
≡ ∆. Therefore, ln∆ = − ln −  lnΩ.
A proxy for the quality of formal institutions securing property rights in each country
, Ω, is built using eight variables provided by the EFN. These variables are all related
to the legal structure and security of property rights in a country: judicial independence,
impartial courts, protection of property rights, military interference in the rule of law and
political process, integrity of the legal system, legal enforcement of contracts, regulatory
restrictions on the sale of real property, and reliability of the police. The arithmetic
average of these eight variables is calculated. The resulting index relative to the United
States is used as a proxy of quality of formal institutions securing property rights in each
country. The quality index of formal institutions securing property rights ranks from 118
(Finland) to 037 (Burundi); its average is 081, standard deviation is 021, average of the
first decile is 115 and average of the last decile is 047.
27For the alternative calibration, the results are similar.
28In the sample, these countries are Kenya (279), Mexico (291), Trinidad & Tobago (305), Honduras
(353), Jamaica (372), Guatemala (394) and Venezuela (479).
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The EFN calculates the arithmetic average of nine variables to obtain an index of the
legal structure and security of property rights in each country of the sample.29 The used
variables are the business costs of crime and the eight variables mentioned above (See
Gwartney et al. (2014)). I do not use the index of business costs of crime to elaborate
a proxy of the quality of formal institutions securing property rights because I use the
inverse of the index of the business costs of crime relative to the United States as a proxy
of the ratio of business costs of predation to GDP in a country relative to the Uinted
States; this, together with the previously calibrated values of the parameters, allows me
to obtain a proxy of ∆.
To calibrate , I perform four ordinary least square regressions in which the dependent
variable is ln∆ and the explicative variables are the quality index of formal institutions
securing property rights, Ω, Gini index of income distribution and GDP per worker. All
variables are in logs. The regressions are performed using a sample of 75 countries with
data for year 2005.30 The results of the regressions are displayed in Table 3. The values
of the regression coeﬃcients for lnΩ range from 083 to 110. 31 Introducing the Gini
index and GDP per worker in the regression might provoke some downward bias on the
estimate of the regression coeﬃcient for lnΩ, because the institutional variable might
influence income per capita and its distribution. However, if these variables are omitted,
the estimate of the regression coeﬃcient for lnΩ might be biased upwards. Considering
these possible biases, a reasonable value for  is −1. Therefore, I set  = −1. Considering
that the calibrated value of  is 021 and that the U.S. index of security of property rights
is normalized to 1, the calibrated value of  is 021.
To analyze the extent to which the observed diﬀerences in quality of formal institutions
securing property rights can account for the observed diﬀerences in TFP and GDP per
worker across countries, the model is simulated for each value of the institutional quality
index in each country, Ω. The results of the simulation are compared with the data. Data
on capital stocks, GDP per worker and TFP are taken from the PWT 8.0 (see Feenstra
et al., 2015). My sample consists of 94 countries. Data are for the year 2005. The results
29These variables are from three primary sources: the International Country Risk Guide, Global Com-
petitiveness Report, and World Bank’s Doing Business project
30Data on the Gini index are provided by the World Bank. For most countries the Gini index is for
year 2005; however, for some countries, it is for a year between 2002 and 2007, because the values for
year 2005 are not available.
31Under the alternative calibration, the dependent variable ln∆ is diﬀerent, but the estimated regres-
sion coeﬃcients are very similar.
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of the simulation are displayed in Figures 3 to 5.
Figure 3 plots the relationship between GDP per worker and the quality index of
formal institutions securing property rights (both in logs and relative to the United States)
in both the model and data. The slope of the linear relation in the model is 042, while
that in the data is 290, which means that, in the data, the improvement of institutional
quality by 1% is related to an average increase by around 29% in GDP per worker, while,
in the model, improving institutional quality by 1% leads to an average increase in GDP
per worker by around 042%. Therefore, the model accounts for 145% of the (average)
relationship between the quality index of formal institutions securing property rights and
GDP per worker observed in the data. In the model, countries in the first decile (resp.
quartile) of the distribution of the institutional quality index have, on average, 146 (resp.
128) times higher GDP than countries in the last decile (resp. quartile). In the data, the
corresponding value is 836 (resp. 574).
Figure 4 plots the relationship between TFP and the quality index of formal institu-
tions securing property rights (both in logs and relative to the United States) in both
the model and data. The slope of the linear relation in the model is 024, while that in
the data is 145, which means that, in the data, the improvement of institutional quality
by 1% is related to an average increase by around 145% in TFP, while, in the model,
improving quality of formal institutions by 1% leads to an average increase in TFP by
around 024%. Therefore, the model accounts for 166% of the (average) relationship be-
tween the quality index of formal institutions securing property rights and TFP observed
in the data. In the model, countries in the first decile (resp. quartile) of the distribution
of the institutional quality index have, on average, 125 (resp. 115) times higher TFP
than countries in the last decile (resp. quartile). In the data, the corresponding value is
286 (resp. 248).
Figure 5 plots the relationship between the ratio of capital to GDP and the quality
index of formal institutions securing property rights (both in logs and relative to the
United States) both in the model and data. The slope of the linear relation in the model
is positive, but small, which is consistent with the lack of a significant relationship in the
data. Therefore, predation in the model aﬀects GDP per worker through TFP and the
ratio of capital to GDP, but the results of the simulation show that contribution of the
ratio of capital to GDP is not significant.
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According to the model, the relationships between the logarithms of TFP and GDP
per worker and the logarithm of the quality index of formal institutions securing property
rights are non-linear and concave. Therefore, the above linear estimates are approxima-
tions of the simulated relationships that can accurately reflect the percentage impact of
the independent variable on the dependent variable around the average, but not in the
tails of the distribution.32 One has to be aware that the percentage impact of improve-
ments in quality of formal institutions securing property rights on productivity is higher
in countries at the bottom of the distribution and lower in countries at the top.
Therefore, another quantitative exercise is performed to have a more accurate view
of the impact of improving institutional quality on productivity. First, I calculate the
average value of the quality index of formal institutions securing property rights for each
decile of its distribution (see second column of Table 4). Second, the model is simulated
to calculate the relative values of GDP per worker and TFP associated with these average
values of the index under the calibrated values. Third, I again simulate the model to
calculate GDP per worker and TFP corresponding to the average values of the index for
each decile of its distribution plus one standard deviation (021) of the index. Finally, I
calculate the simulated percent increase in GDP per worker and TFP.
The results of the simulations (see Table 4) show that improving the quality of formal
institutions securing property rights can have a large positive impact on the productivity
of countries at the bottom of the distribution by reducing predation. In particular, if the
institutional quality index increases by one standard deviation, then, for a country with
a value of the index equal to the average value of the last decile (resp. first decile) of
its distribution, the ratio of business costs of predation to GDP decreases by 36% (resp.
16%), while its GDP per worker increases by 23% (resp. 27%), TFP increases by 12%
(resp. 15%), and ratio of capital to GDP increases by 6% (resp. 08%). Therefore, most
of the increase in GDP per worker is due to the increase of TFP, not to the increase in
the ratio of capital to GDP.33
32Under the alternative calibration, the slope of the linear relation in the model between the quality
index of formal institutions securing property rights and TFP (resp. GDP per worker) is 018 (resp.
032). Countries in the first decile of the distribution of the quality index of formal institutions securing
property rights have, on average, 118 times higher TFP and 135 times higher GDP per worker than
countries in the last decile.
33Under the alternative calibration, if the institutional quality index increases by one standard devia-
tion, then, for a country with a value of the index equal to the average value of the last decile (resp. first
decile) of its distribution, the ratio of business costs of predation to GDP decreases by 35% (resp. 16%),
while its GDP per worker increases by 18% (resp. 23%), TFP increases by 95% (resp. 12%), and ratio
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4 Conclusion
I have developed a neoclassical growth model with imperfect property rights in which
economic agents allocate resources both for carrying out and deterrring predatory ac-
tivities, as well as for productive activities. In this context, predation has a negative
impact on productivity because it involves the waste of resources in unproductive preda-
tory activities, while it also discourages capital accumulation and business entry, which
are deadweight losses. In the rent-seeking literature, there is a debate on the relative
importance of the waste of resources and deadweight losses. In the model, the deadweight
losses might be very large, higher than the losses due to waste of resources for large values
of the predation rate.
The welfare and productivity losses caused by crime –which is an important type of
predation– can be noteworthy. In particular, according to the model, the U.S. welfare
costs of crime represent a loss of 186% of consumption per capita and U.S. GDP per
worker is reduced by 175%. Moreover, for a country in the average of the distribution of
the index of business costs of crime for 94 countries, consumption per capita and GDP
per worker are reduced by 251% and 238%, respectively, because of crime. For a country
with a value of the index equal to the average of the last decile, consumption per capita
and GDP per worker are reduced by 578% and 559%, respectively. According to the
calibrated model, in the United States, 786% of the reduction in consumption per capita
would be due to the waste of resource, while 214% would be due to the deadweight losses.
However, for a country in the average of the last decile, these percentages are reversed to,
215% and 785%.
The improvement of quality of formal institutions securing property rights could be
a successful development policy strongly enhancing productivity by reducing predatory
activities. In the model, countries in the first decile of the distribution of the quality
index of formal institutions securing property rights have, on average, 125 times higher
TFP and 146 times higher GDP per worker than countries in the last decile. In the
data, the corresponding values are 286 and 836. Moreover, if the quality index of formal
institutions securing property rights increases by one standard deviation, then, for a
country with an institutional quality index equal to the average of the last decile of its
distribution, the ratio of business costs of predation to GDP is reduced by 36%, while
of capital to GDP increases by 55% (resp. 08%).
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GDP per worker (resp. TFP) increases by 23% (resp. 12%).
Undoubtedly, security of property rights may influence resource allocation in diﬀerent
ways, as pointed out by Besley and Ghatak (2010). For this reason, to develop growth
models in which security of property rights influences productivity in other ways besides
predation may improve our understanding of the importance of security of property rights
for economic development.
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A Predation and resource allocation
DefinitionA predation rate, 0    1, solving (17) and such that  ,  and (1−  + + ) 
are between 0 and 1 is an interior predatory equilibrium of the model.
The following proposition states that there exists a small enough  such that a unique
interior equilibrium exists.
Proposition 1 There exists a suﬃciently small   0 such that for all  ≤  the
system of equations formed by (8), (17), (18) and (19) has a unique interior solution with
 ,   and (1−  + + )  belonging to the interval (0 1).
Proof: From the properties of function e () ≡  ( ) and the intermediate
value theorem, it follows that equation (17) has a unique solution. The values of , 
and  that solve (17), (18) and (19) go to 0 when  goes to 0. If  goes to 0, then
(1−  + + )  goes to 0 and  goes to 0  (1−)
1−  1. Therefore, it follows from
equations (8), (17), (18) and (19) that there exists a value of  suﬃciently close to 0 such
that , ,   and (1−  + + )  lie between 0 and 1.¤
Proposition 2 states how changes in predatory eﬃciency aﬀect the predation rate and
the resource allocation to predatory activities.
Proposition 2 If   , then (i)   and  are strictly increasing functions of ,
 and , and (ii)  and  are strictly decreasing functions of , while  is a strictly
increasing function of .
Proof: From the equilibrium condition (17) and the properties of function ( ),
it follows that, in equilibrium,
0   (1 ( ) + 2 ( ))  1 (A.1)
Diﬀerentiating equations (17), (18) and (19) with respect to  yields
d 
d  =
 ( )
1−  (1 ( ) + 2 ( )) 
d 
d  =
d 
d  ,
and
d 
d  =
d 
d 31
Diﬀerentiating equations (19), (17) and (18) with respect to  yields
d 
d  =
 (1− 2 ( ))
1−  (1 ( ) + 2 ( )) 
d 
d  =
1
³
 
´

1−  (1 ( ) + 2 ( )) 
and
d 
d  =
1 ( ) 
1−  (1 ( ) + 2 ( )) 
Diﬀerentiating equations (19), (17) and (18) with respect to  yields
d 
d  =
 (1− 2 ( ))
1−  (1 ( ) + 2 ( )) 
d 
d  =
1 ( )
1−  (1 ( ) + 2 ( )) 
and
d 
d  =
1 ( )
1−  (1 ( ) + 2 ( )) 
Therefore, the (i) statement in Proposition 2 follows from previous equations, together
with condition (A.1) and the facts that1
³
 
´
 0 and2
³
 
´
 0 are satisfied.
Diﬀerentiating equations (19), (17) and (18) with respect to  yields
d 
d  =
2 ( ) 
1−  (1 ( ) + 2 ( )) 
d 
d  =
2 ( ) 
1−  (1 ( ) + 2 ( )) 
and
d 
d  =
 (1− 1 ( ))
1−  (1 ( ) + 2 ( )) 
where 1− 1 ( ) = 1−1 ( ) ()  0 because 11  0. Therefore,
the (ii) statement in Proposition 2 follows from previous equations, together with condi-
tion (A.1) and the fact that 2 ( )  0 is satisfied, which completes the proof of
Proposition 2. ¤
An increase of  represents a neutral increase in eﬃciency in predation. An increase
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of  implies (i) an increase of the predation rate, , given  and , (ii) an increase of the
fraction of output devoted to capture rents, , which increases , and (iii) an increase
of the fraction of output devoted to deter predation, , which reduces . The latter two
eﬀects simply oﬀset. Therefore,  increases when  rises.
An increase of  represents an increase in specific eﬃciency in predation-holding ac-
tivities. An increase of  (i) encourages households to devote more resources to capture
rents, , which implies an increase of , and (ii) firms react to this increase of  increasing
the resources devoted to deter predation, . A decrease in the fraction of output destroyed
in the course of predatory activities (i.e. an increase of ) has the same consequences as
an increase in .
An increase of  represents an increase in specific eﬃciency in deterrence of predation.
An increase of  (i) encourages firms to devote resources to deter the capture of rents, ,
which reduces , while (ii) it also discourages households to devote resources to capture
rents, , which reduces  and, in turn, (iii) it impels firms to reduce the resources devoted
to deter the capture of rents, . Consequently, the eﬀect of an increase of  on  is a priori
ambiguous. It depends on how much a lower  influences : if a lower  greatly reduces
, then firms reduce the fraction of resources devoted to deter the capture of rents, but
if a lower  provokes a small reduction of , then firms increase the fraction of resources
devoted to deter the capture of rents. Properties of function  imply that elasticity of
 with respect to  is lower than 1 in equilibrium ( ≡ 1 ( ) 1()  1),
which implies that the net eﬀect of an increase of  on  is positive.
The following proposition states how the equilibrium number of firms is aﬀected by
changes in eﬃciency in predation.
Proposition 3 If   , then (i) total variable labor per capita, , (resp. the number
of firms per capita, ) is a strictly increasing (resp. decreasing) function of ,  and ,
(ii) if  (1− )−  1−, then total variable labor per capita, , (resp. the number
of firms per capita, ) is a strictly decreasing (resp. increasing) function of , and (iii)
if  (1− )−   1− , then total variable labor per capita, , (resp. the number of
firms per capita, ) is a strictly increasing (resp. decreasing) function of . Where
0   = 1 ( )  ( )  1 (A.2)
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is the elasticity of the predation function with respect to  evaluated in  =  ( ),
and
0   = 2 ( )  ( )  1 (A.3)
is the elasticity of the predation function with respect to  evaluated in  =  ( ).
Proof: Diﬀerentiating equation (8), it follows that  is a strictly increasing function
of . From (4), it follows that  is a strictly decreasing function of . Thus,  is a strictly
decreasing function of . Proposition 2 states that  is a strictly increasing function of
,  and  . Therefore, the (i) statement in Proposition 3 follows. Equation (8) can be
rewritten as
 = 1− −  
1−  (A.4)
where  ≡  (1− ) 1− . Diﬀerentiating equation (A.4) with respect to  yields
d 
d  = −
1
1− 
µ
+ 1
1− 
d 
d 
¶
 (A.5)
Taking into account that
d 
d  =
2 ( ) 
1−  (1 ( ) + 2 ( )) 
Therefore, d d   0 if and only if
1 +
1
1− 
2 ( ) 
1−  (1 ( ) + 2 ( ))  0 (A.6)
and d d   0 if and only if
1 +
1
1− 
2 ( ) 
1−  (1 ( ) + 2 ( ))  0 (A.7)
Taking into account that, in equilibrium,  = () ,  = () and  =
 ( ) are satisfied, then a little of algebra and conditions (A.6) and (A.7) show
that d d   0 if and only if
(1− )1 ( )  ( ) − 2 ( )

 ( )  1− 
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which establishes (ii), and that d d   0 if and only if
(1− )1 ( )  ( ) − 2 ( )

 ( )  1− 
which establishes (iii). Therefore, the proof of Proposition 3 is completed.¤
An increase of ,  or  reduces the number of firms because their profits go down. On
one hand, an increase of any of these parameters provokes an increase of the predation
rate, which reduces profits of firms because predation works as a tax on production.
On the other hand, an increase of any of these parameters encourages firms to devote
more resources to deter predation in response to a higher predation. The higher costs of
deterring predation reduce profits and discourage entry.
However, an increase of  has an ambiguous eﬀect on the profits of firms and, hence,
on the number of firms. On one hand, their profits are higher because the predation
rate decreases. On the other hand, their profits are lower because firms devote a higher
fraction of their output to deter predation. Proposition 3 establishes that if the weighted
sum of the elasticities of predation with respect to  and  is large enough, then the first
eﬀect predominates; but, if it is small, then the second eﬀect predominates.
The following proposition states that a higher number of firms increases productivity.
Proposition 4 If   , then  is a strictly decreasing (resp. increasing) function of
total variable labor used in production,  (resp. the number of firms per capita, ).
Proof: Diﬀerentiating equation (14) with respect to  yields
d 
d  =

1− 
µ
 (1− ) 1−  − (1− )
¶

From equation (8), it follows that  (1− ) 1− − (1− ) = − 1−  0, which establishes
Proposition 4.¤
On one hand, more firms -i.e., a higher (1− )- increase aggregate productivity because
firms face diminishing returns to scale. On the other hand, more operating firms imply
that fewer workers are engaged directly in production -i.e., a smaller -, which reduces .
However, the first eﬀect predominates.
The following proposition states how multifactor productivity is aﬀected by changes
in eﬃciency in predation.
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Proposition 5 If   , then (i)  is a strictly decreasing function of ,  and ,
(ii) if  (1− )−   1−  then  is a strictly increasing function of , (iii) and if
 (1− )−   1−  then  is a strictly decreasing function of , where  and
 are respectively given by (A.2) and (A.3) and they are evaluated in  =  ( ).
Proof: Proposition 5 follows from Proposition 2, Proposition 3 and Proposition 4.¤
The higher is ,  or , the lower are the profits of firms because higher is the preda-
tion rate and more resources are devoted to deter predation. Therefore, the equilibrium
number of firms is lower, which aﬀects negatively multifactor productivity because there
are diminishing returns to scale. However, if an increase of  implies a decrease (resp. an
increase) of the equilibrium number of firms, then multifactor productivity, , decreases
(resp. increases).
The following proposition states the consequences of changes in eﬃciency in predation
on consumption per capita, capital per capita and output per capita along a BGP.
Proposition 6 Along a BGP, (i) output per capita, , consumption per capita, , and
capital per capita, , are decreasing functions of ,  and , (ii) if  (1− )−  
1− , then output per capita, , and capital per capita, , are increasing functions of ,
where  and  are respectively given by (A.2) and (A.3) and they are evaluated in
 =  ( ).
Proof: Along a BGP
· = 0 and · = 0 for all . It follows from (6) and (13) that
along a BGP
 =
µ
(1− )
 +  
¶ 1
1−
(A.8)
and
 =  11−
µ 
 +  
¶ 1
1−  (A.9)
where  =  + . Proposition 2 states that  is a strictly increasing function of , 
and  . Proposition 5 states that  is a strictly decreasing function of . Therefore, from
Proposition 2, Proposition 5 and equations (A.8) and (A.9), it follows that  and  are
strictly decreasing functions of ,  and  .
It follows from (B.2) that along a BGP
 = (1−Φ)  −∆ (A.10)
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where Φ ≡ 1−  +  +  and ∆ ≡  +  + . Diﬀerentiating (A.10) with respect to 
yields:
d 
d  = −Φ
 + (1−Φ) d 
d  +
£
(1−Φ)−1 −∆¤ d 
d   (A.11)
Diﬀerentiating (8) with respect to , it follows that  is a strictly increasing function of .
Proposition 4 states that  is a strictly decreasing function of . Therefore, in an interior
equilibrium, d d   0. From the fact that d d   0 and equation (A.8), it follows that
d 
d   0. If Φ  1, then (1−Φ)−1−∆  0 since + +   ∆. Therefore, from
equation (A.11), it follows that if Φ  1, then d d   0.
From (A.8), it follows that
d 
d 
1
 − (1− )
d 
d 
1
 =
1
1− 
Using previous equation, equation (A.11) can be rewritten as
d 
d  =
1− Φ
1−  
 +
(1− Φ)  −∆

d 
d  
which, using equation (A.10), can be rewritten again as
d 
d  =
1−Φ
1−  
 +
d 
d 

 
If Φ  1, taking into account that d d   0, then d d   0. Therefore, from d d   0 and
Proposition 2, it follows that  is a strictly decreasing function of ,  and  .
Proposition 2 states that  is a strictly decreasing function of . Proposition 5 states
that, if  (1− )−  1−, then  is a strictly increasing function of . Therefore,
(ii) statement follows from Proposition 2, Proposition 5 and equations (A.8) and (A.9).
¤
A higher predation rate reduces capital, output and consumption per capita because
predation works as a tax which discourages both capital accumulation and entry of firms
and because it also diverts resources from productive to unproductive uses. An increase
of ,  and  has an unambiguous impact on the long run variables because it implies an
increase in the predation rate, in the fraction of resources devoted to carry out predation
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and in the fraction of resources devoted to deter predation, as well as a decrease in
multifactor productivity.
However, an increase of  implies a decrease of , which contributes to increase capital
and output per capita along a BGP, but multifactor productivity, , could increase or
decrease. If a higher  implies a higher multifactor productivity, then capital per capita
and output per capita increase along a BGP, but if a higher  implies a lower multifactor
productivity, , then the eﬀect on capital per capita and output per capita along a BGP
is ambiguous. The eﬀect of an increase of  on consumption per capita is ambiguous,
even if the predation rate falls and multifactor productivity increases. The reason is that
a higher  implies an increase in the fraction of output devoted to deter predation, which
might imply a reduction of consumption per capita.
The following proposition states that changes in neutral eﬃciency in predation aﬀect
both TFP and the ratio of capital to GDP, as well as the ratio of business costs of predation
to GDP.
Proposition 7 Along a BGP, (i) the ratio of business costs of predation to GDP, ,
is a strictly increasing function of neutral eﬃciency in predation, , (ii) GDP per capita
is a strictly decreasing function of neutral eﬃciency in predation, , (iii) TFP is a strictly
decreasing function of neutral eﬃciency in predation,(iv) if  (− 1)+  0 then the
ratio of capital to GDP is a strictly increasing function of , (v) if  (− 1) +  
0 then the ratio of capital to GDP is a strictly decreasing function of , and (vi) if
 (− 1) +  = 0 then the ratio of capital to GDP does not depend on .
Proof: Diﬀerentiating equation (21) with respect to  yields
d 
d  = (1 + )
1
[1− (1−  +  + ) ]2  0 (A.12)
Therefore, (i) statement in Proposition 7 follows from (A.12) and Proposition 2. GDP
per capita is given by  =  = (1− (1−  +  + ) ) , therefore (ii) state-
ment in Proposition 7 follows from Proposition 2 and Proposition 6. TFP is  =
(1− (1−  +  + ) ) , therefore, (iii) statement in Proposition 7 follows fromPropo-
sition 2 and Proposition 5. The ratio of capital to GDP is

 =

 + + 
1− 
1− (1−  +  + ) 
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Diﬀerentiating previous equation with respect to  yields
d
³


´
d  =

 + + 
 (− 1) + 
[1− (1−  +  + ) ]2  (A.13)
Therefore, (iv), (v) and (vi) statements in Proposition 7 follow from (A.13) and Proposi-
tion 2.¤
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B Transitional dynamics and dynamic ineﬃciency
Transitional dynamics
The transitional dynamics of the model with predation are similar to the transitional
dynamics of the standard neoclassical growth model without predation. In equilibrium, 
, ,  and  are constant for all . Therefore, taking into account that detrended output
per capita is given by (13) and using the first-order condition for the profit-maximizing
problem of a firm (6) and the resource constraint (15), the Euler condition (11) and the
evolution law of detrended capital per capita (16) can be rewritten as
•
 =
1

¡ (1− ) −1 −  − ¢−  (B.1)
and
• = (1− (1−  + + ) ) −1 −  − ( +  + )  (B.2)
which together with the transversality condition (10) and an initial stock of detrended
capital per capita, 0, characterize the equilibrium dynamics of the model. The neoclas-
sical standard growth model with perfect property rights arises as a parametric limit case
when  goes to 0.
On dynamic eﬃciency
Along a BGP, both detrended capital per capita and detrended consumption per capita
remain constant,
· = 0 and · = 0. Therefore, it follows from equation (B.1) that, along
a BGP, detrended capital per capita is ∗ =
³
(1− )  ++
´ 1
1−
. From equation (B.2),
it follows that steady detrended consumption per capita is a function of detrended capital
per capita,  = (1− (1−  + + ) ) −1− ( +  + ) . The Golden Rule stock of
detrended capital per capita is the stock of detrended capital per capita which maximizes
steady detrended consumption per capita,  =
³
(1− (1−  + + ) )  ++
´ 1
1−
.
Therefore, ∗   if and only if 1−
1−(1−++)  ++++ .
The phase diagram of the system of equations in (B.1) and (B.2) is similar to the
phase diagram of the standard neoclassical growth model. Accordingly, if ∗  , then a
Pareto improvement can be achieved by reducing the long-run stock of detrended capital
per capita. Therefore, an equilibriummight be dynamically ineﬃcient even if the transver-
sality condition is satisfied. The reason for a possible overaccumulation of capital even if
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the transversality condition is satisfied is that marginal productivity of capital does not
reflect its social return because part of the output is wasted on unproductive predatory
activities. However, if the transversality condition is satisfied ( i.e.  +    +), then
a suﬃcient condition for dynamic eﬃciency is that 1−  +  +  ≤ 1. This condition is
satisfied for the calibrated values of the parameters in Section 3.
The focus of development policies has fluctuated between promoting the accumulation
of productive factors and improving institutions. The possibility of dynamic ineﬃciency
suggests that to do the former, ignoring the latter, might even be counterproductive.
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C Some microstructure of the predatory sector
Households
Output captured by household  by means of predation is  =  (  ) and
the obtained transfers are  = . A household solves the following maximization
problem: max  (  ) − . Therefore, it is assumed that predatory activities
of households present an externality because when one household maximizes utility by
choosing how many resources to devote to predation, it takes the total amount of resources
devoted to predation by all households as given, but the eﬀectiveness of the resources spent
by one household depends on both individual and aggregate expenditures. The first order
condition of the household maximization problem is 4 (  ) = 1. It is assumed
that
 (  ) = e (  ) µ
¶

where e  0. It is assumed that 0  0 and 00  0 in order to guarantee the existence of
a maximum of the household maximization problem. The aggregate resources captured
by predation are
 =
Z 1
0
 d  =
Z 1
0
e (  ) µ
¶
d 
In a symmetric equilibrium  = . Therefore, in a symmetric equilibrium 
³


´
=
 (1) ≡  and
 =
Z 1
0
e (  ) d  =  (  ) 
where  ≡ e. The first order condition can be rewritten as e( ) 0 ³ ´ = 1In a
symmetric equilibrium the first order condition is ( )  = 1, where 0 (1) ≡  and
 =  is the elasticity of function  in a symmetric equilibrium.
Firms
Output captured by predation to firm  is  =  ( ). A firm solves the
following maximization problem: min  ( )+.Therefore, it is assumed
that activities of firms oriented toward deterring predation present an externality because
when one firm maximizes profits by choosing how many resources to devote to deterrence,
it takes the total amount of resources devoted to deterrence by all firms as given as well
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as the number of firms; however, the eﬀectiveness of the resources spent by one firm
depends on both individual and aggregate expenditures. The first order condition of the
firm minimization problem is −6 ( ) = 1. It is assumed that
 ( ) = e (  )  
µ

¶
The aggregate resources captured to firms by predation are
 =
Z 
0
e (  )  
µ

¶
d 
In a symmetric equilibrium,  =  and  =  . Therefore, in a symmetric equilibrium
the aggregate resources captured to firms by predation are
 =
Z 
0
 (  ) d  =
Z 
0
e (  )  (1) d 
It is assumed that  (1) =  (1) ≡  in order to guarantee that  =  =  and, thus, the
existence of a symmetric equilibrium. The first order condition of the firm minimization
problem is −e (  )   0 ¡¢  = 1. It is assumed that  0  0 and  00  0 in
order to guarantee the existence of a minimum of the firm minimization problem. In a
symmetric equilibrium the first order condition is  (  ) 1 = 1,where  0 (1) ≡ −
and  =  is the elasticity of function  in a symmetric equilibrium.
Firm behavior might be described in another way. It might be assumed that firms
contest predation. Let  be aggregate output captured by households by means of pre-
dation, then output captured to firm  by predation is  = , where  depends on
the relative size of the firm and the relative resources devoted to carrying out predation,
 =  
¡

¢
with  (1) = 1.
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Figure 1: Security of property rights and the business costs of predation
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Figure 2: Business costs of predation and GDP per worker
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Figure 3: Security of property rights and GDP per worker
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Figure 4: Security of property rights and TFP
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Figure 5: Security of property rights and the ratio of capital to GDP
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Figure 6: Business costs of crime, consumption per worker, GDP per worker and contributions
of TFP and the ratio of capital to GDP
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Figure 7: Deadweight losses vs. waste of resources
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Table 1 (Part 1): The costs of crime
The costs of crime $ Billion Type
Crime-Induced Production
Drug traficking 160.584 S*, T
Police proteccion 47.129 D
Corrections 35.879 D
Prenatal exposure to cocaine and heroin 28.156 O
Anticrime components of federal agency budgets 23.381 D
Judicial and legal services, states and local 18.901 D
Guard 17.917 D
Drug control 10.951 D
DUI cost to driver 10.302 D
Medical care for victims 8.990 O
Computer viruses and security 8.000 D,O
Alarm systems 6.478 D
Passes for business access 4.659 D
Locks, safes and vaults 4.359 D
Vandalism (except arson) 2.317 O
Small arms and small arms ammunition 2.252 D,S
Replacements due to arson 1.902 O
Surveillance cameras 1.471 D
Safety lighting 1.466 D
Protective fences and gates 1.159 D
Airport security 0.448 D
Nonlethal weaponry (for example, mace) 0.324 D,S
Electronic retail article surveillance 0.149 D
Theft insurance (less indemnity) 0.096 O
Guard dogs 0.049 D
Expenditures by mothers against drunk driving 0.049 D
Library theft detection 0.028 D
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Table 1 (Part 2): The costs of crime
The costs of crime $ Billions Type
Opportunity Costs
Time spent securing assets 89.567 D*
Criminal’s lost work days
In prision 35.097 S*
Planning and executing crimes 4.109 S*
Victims’ lost work days 0,876 O
Time spent on neighborhood watches 0.655 D*
Value of Risk to Life and Health
Value of lost life 439.88 O
Value of injuries 134.515 O
Transfers Costs
Occupational fraud 203.952 T
Unpaid taxes 123.108 T
Health insurance fraud 108.61 T
Financial institutions fraud 52.901 T
Mail fraud 35.986 T
Property/casualty insurance fraud 20.527 T
Telemarketing fraud 16.609 T
Business burglary 13.229 T
Motor vehicle theft 8.913 T
Shoplifting 7.185 T
Household burglary 4.527 T
Personal theft 3.909 T
Household larceny 1.996 T
Coupon fraud 0.912 T
Robbery 0.775 T
D= Resources devoted to deterrring predation; S=resources devoted to carrying out predation;
O= Resources destroyed in the course of predation; T=Resources transferred by predation;
B=T+O=Resources captured by predation. An asterisk, *, denotes resources devoted to dete-
rring or carrying out predation not included in GDP. Source: Anderson (1999)
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Table 2: Resources involved in predation
Resources involved in predation $ Billions
Resources captured by predation ( =  +  ) 1384.456
Resources destroyed in the course of predation () 620.732
Resources transferred by predation ( ) 763.724
Resources devoted to carrying out predation () 201.078
Not included in predation () 199.79
Resources devoted to deterring predation () 280.284
Not included in GDP () 90.222
1997 U.S. GDP 8278.901
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Table 3: Regressions
Coeﬃcient
(Standard deviation)
Formal institutions
1101
(0103)
0827
(0096)
1052
(0155)
0869
(0131)
Gini index
−0631
(0105)
−0639
(0107)
GDP per worker
0017
(0041)
−0016
(0034)
2 609 74 61 741
The dependent variable is ln∆. All variables are in logs. The Gini index and the index of formal
institutions securing property rights are significant at 95% in all regressions. GDP per worker is
not significant at 90% in any regression.
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Table 4: Improving quality of formal institutions
Percentage variation
Decile Ω    
1 1.152 -16.31% 1.52% 0.84% 2.72%
2 1.068 -17.47% 1.77% 0.98% 3.17%
3 0.959 -19.27% 2.22% 1.23% 3.98%
4 0.886 -20.68% 2.62% 1.45% 4.70%
5 0.844 -21.59% 2.90% 1.60% 5.21%
6 0.775 -23.30% 3.49% 1.93% 6.29%
7 0.712 -25.07% 4.19% 2.30% 7.57%
8 0.666 -26.56% 4.87% 2.65% 8.81%
9 0.596 -29.24% 6.34% 3.39% 11.50%
10 0.466 -35.86% 12.42% 5.86% 22.65%
Ω is the index of quality of formal institutions,  is the ratio of business costs
of predation to GDP,  is Total Factor Productivity,  is the ratio of capi-,
tal to GDP, and  is GDP per worker.
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